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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Verna Lombard appeals from the sentence and restitution order imposed
upon her conviction for burglary and grand theft.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas
Responding to a customer's tip, Don Ebert, co-owner of Mary Ann's
Groceries in Weippe, set up hidden video cameras in his store to observe the
activities of clerk Verna Lombard. (Tr., p.32, L.18

- p.36,

L.22.)

Ebert also

reviewed the cash register till tapes generated during Lombard's shifts. (&
generally, Tr., p.40, L.14 - p.163, L.1.)
Ebert discovered that on approximately fifty-three occasions during the six
days Lombard was under video surveillance, Lombard entered the "no sale" key
into the cash register, yet took money from the customer in exchange for
merchandise or gas. (Id.) Thus, explained Ebert, Lombard executed cash sales
that would not be recorded as sales on the cash register till tapes. (Id.) Then,
Ebert observed, Lombard would periodically take money from the cash register
and put it in her back pocket. (Id.) At the end of each day, the sales receipts
would thus correspond with the money in the till. (Id.)
Ebert also located a number of credit card receipts, indicating completed
sales processed by Lombard, that corresponded by date and time with "no sale"
events entered into the cash register till during Lombard's shifts. (Tr., p.162, L.3

- p.166, L.22.)

The earliest such receipt, for $49.95, was from October 19, 2004.

(Tr.,p.166, L.23-~.167,L.7.)

Finally, while recognizing there are some legitimate reasons to enter the
"no sale" key into the cash register, Ebert, in reviewing the cash register till tapes,
noticed that the number of "no sale" events entered during Lombard's shifts was
significantly higher than the amount of "no sale" events entered during other
employees' shifts during the entirety of Lombard's employment at Mary Ann's
Groceries. (Tr.,p.167,L.8-p.170,L.lO.)
On September 9, 2007, after completing her sixth shift following the
installation of the video cameras, Lombard was arrested by Officer Mitchell Jared
for burglary and grand theft. (Tr., p.220, L.11 - p.221, L.18.) At the time of her
arrest, Lombard had $282 in her back pocket. (Tr., p.223, L.22

- p.227, L.12.)

The bills were separated into ten groups that were folded together. (Id.) After
Officer Jared intentionally misled Lombard into believing that she had actually
been under video surveillance since June, Lombard admitted to stealing money
from Mary Ann's Groceries since late June. (Tr., p.230, L.21

- p.232, L.13.)

Lombard told Officer Jared that while she did not steal from the store every day,
she stole approximately $50 to $60 dollars per day that she did steal. (Tr., p.232,
Ls.13-18.)
A jury found Lombard guilty of burglary and grand theft. (R. p.121.) The
district court sentenced her to concurrent unified sentences of eight years, with
two and a half years fixed. (R., pp.?21-122.) The court retained jurisdiction.
(Id.) The length of the indeterminate portion of the sentence was designed, at
least in part, to allow Lombard ample time to comply with any restitution order.

(Tr., p.273, Ls.23-25.) The court also scheduled a restitution hearing. (R.,
p.122.)
The state submitted an affidavit for restitution requesting that Lombard be
ordered to pay $100,000 to Mary Ann's Groceries, and $5,000 to Western
Community lnsurance Company, which had paid out on a policy owned by the
victims.

(R., pp.108-109, 114-115.) Don Ebert, who has a background in

statistics, submitted several estimates calculating the total extent of Lombard's
theft. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.287, L.5 - p.291, L.18.) The estimates ranged from
$71,936.81 to $204,446.86, and were based on information in the record
concerning when Lombard began working at Mary Ann's Groceries, the earliest
documented theft, the amount of money found on her person at the time of
arrest, and the average amount of "no-sale" entries recorded by the cash register
till during Lombard's shifts compared to the that recorded during the shifts of
other employees. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.245, L.25 - p.247, L.9; Tr., p.288, L.19

- p.291, L.10.)
Utilizing the average of the lowest range of estimates provided by Ebert,
the district court ordered Lombard to pay $80,000 in restitution to Mary Ann's
Groceries, and $5,000 to Western Community Insurance Company. (R., pp.136137; Tr., p.305, Ls.3-12.)

Lombard timely appealed her sentence and the

restitution order. (R., pp. 139-142.)

ISSUES
Lombard states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in
ordering a restitution amount that was not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence and is thus not supported by
substantial evidence.

2.

Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in
sentencing Verna Lombard by considering facts not
supported by substantial evidence in the record.

(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Lombard failed to show that the district court's order of restitution was
not supported by substantial evidence?

2.

Has Lombard failed to show that the district court abused its discretion at
sentencing?

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court's Restitution Award Was Supported By Substantial Evidence
A.

Introduction
Lombard claims that the district court abused its discretion by ordering her

to pay $85,000 in restitution.

However, because the restitution order was

supported by substantial evidence, Lombard has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion.'

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is

committed to the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's factual findings in
relation to restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007).
C.

The District Court's Restitution Award For Lombard's Theft Was
Supported By Substantial Evidence
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(2), the district court is authorized to order

restitution for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers. Unless the
court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or
undesirable, it is required to order a defendant to make restitution. I.C.

5

19-

5304(2). Value need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence,

'

Lombard also appears to argue that the court abused its discretion by rejecting
the parties' Rule 11 plea agreement. (See Appellant's brief, pp.1, 5-6, 13-15.)
This Court should not entertain this claim, however, because it is not supported
by argument or authority (State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996)), and it is not included in Lombard's issue statement (I.A.R. 35(a)(4)).

see I.C.
-

(i 19-5304(6), and can be established by the owner of the property.

Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295, 306, 971
P.2d 1119, 1130 (1998).
The state filed an affidavit requesting $100,000 in restitution. (R., pp.108109.) The victim, Don Ebert, provided the court with two estimate ranges of
Lombard's total theft based on the evidence in the case. (R., pp.112-113; Tr.,
p.245, L.25 - p.247, L.9; Tr., p.288, L.19 - p.291, 1.10.) Ebert also described his
qualifications to make such calculations. (Tr., p.287, L.17 - p.288, L.15.)
On appeal, Lombard contends that by relying on Ebert's calculated
estimates of her theft, the district court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief,
pp.4-13.) Lombard argues that "[rlestitution is limited to actual loss and thus
should not be speculative at all. The statistical analysis offered by Don Ebert and
subsequently adopted by the District Court is nothing but speculations," and that
,

,

:

"[tlhe State failed to make any showing of actual loss." (Appellant's brief, p.10.)
Lombard also attempts to place some of the blame for the restitution dispute with
the record-keeping of Mary Ann's Groceries, arguing that, "[it's] a matter of
simple bookkeeping and accounting to determine how much 'cash' should have
been running through the business based on the sale of inventory. [It's] then
simply a matter of identifying the actual cash versus the amount of cash that
should have been running through the store." (Appellant's brief, p.9.)
The record shows, however, that the district court's restitution award was
supported by substantial evidence, and was based on the actual loss of the
victims. Because the district court restitution award was clearly directed towards

Ebert's actual, not speculative loss, Lombard's argument that the state did not
present the type of evidence she would have preferred fails to show the order
was not based on substantial evidence.
In State v. Benoit, 310 Mont. 449, 457, 51 P.3d 495, 500-501 (2002), The
Montana Supreme Court recognized the inherent challenges involving the
estimation of the scope of stealth employee theft over a period of time, for the
purpose of determining appropriate restitution:
The evidence presented at the [restitution] hearing in this
case establishes that actual losses resulting from [the defendant's]
theft could not be determined with certainty. As a result, [the victim]
made several assumptions to determine restitution.
[The
defendant's] witness, Loucks, disputed the assumptions made by
[the victim] and suggested several variables which could be further
explored to compile restitution, but he acknowledged that there is
often "some guess work associated with determining losses
sustained from employee theft. Loucks further acknowledged that
implementation of such variables could alter the amount of
restitution calculated by [the victim] to [the defendant's] detriment.
Moreover, [the defendant] did not provide the court with a
reasonable estimation of the losses sustained by [the victim].
Therefore, we conclude that the methods utilized by [the victim] and
subsequently adopted by the court were reasonable based on the
best evidence available under the circumstances presented in this
case.
Similarly, the district court in the present case also recognized these
challenges, and adopted reasonable estimations based on the best evidence
available under the circumstances presented:
I'm going to make findings that given the nature of the
offense, if we took [the defendant's] approach that you can never
use a statistical model there would never be restitution in this sort
of offense, and what that would mean is that the criminal conduct
trumps the victim's right for restitution. And I don't think that's what
the law requires. I think it requires the reverse of that. And while
there does have to be shown by a preponderance of the evidence
[sic], I think given the nature of the offense, a statistical model is

appropriate. And it can only be based on the information they
have, and I think Mr. Ebert has done that. He's shown himself to
[be] accomplished in statistical analysis.
(Tr., p.304, L.14-p.305, L.2.)
The district court's reasoning was proper, particularly considering the
public policy underlying the ldaho restitution statute to "favor full compensation to
crime victims who suffer economic loss." State v. Bvbee, 115 ldaho 541, 543,
768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(2), unless the
district court determined that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or
undesirable, which it clearly did not, it was required to order Lombard to make
restitution to her victims for economic loss resulting from the crime.
While the court's restitution order relied on estimates supplied by the
victim, these estimates, and the restitution order amount of $85,000, was
supported by substantial evidence in the record:
Victims Don and Cammie Ebert submitted a letter to the court
stating that they believed that Verna Lombard stole at least
$100,000 from Mary Ann's Groceries. (R., p.1II.)
The state submitted a letter and receipts from Western Community
Insurance indicating that it had paid the victims $5,000 in fulfillment
of an insurance policy protecting against employee theft. (R,,
pp.114-115.)
Lombard admitted stealing between $50 and $60 "most days"
between late June and her September arrest. (Tr., p.231, L.24 p.233, L.25.)
Over a six-month sampling of cash register till tape data, Lombard's
shifts averaged 10.13 more "no sale" events than the average
number of "no sale" events recorded during shifts that she did not
work.
This difference increased throughout Lombard's
employment, from 7.46 per day in July 2004, to 12.28 per day in
June 2007. This difference also "spiked" during a two week period
when the Eberts were away on vacation, and had left the store

under limited supervision. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.168, L.13
p.170, L.IO;Tr.,p.288, L.19-p.289, L.7.)

-

Upon her arrest, Lombard had $282 in her back pocket. The bills
were folded into ten groups. This approximately corresponds with
the twelve suspicious "no sale" transactions observed on that day.
(Tr., p.223, L.22-p.227, L.12.)
During the six days Lombard was under video surveillance, she
executed approximately fifty-three inappropriate "no sale" events,
and was observed periodically removing cash from the cash
register and placing it in her pocket. (Tr., p.40, L.14 - p.152, L.5;
p.282, Ls.18-22.)
Store customer LanceNewton, who tipped off the Eberts to the
thefts, testified that he observed Lombard complete suspicious
transactions "20 or 3 0 times between June and August 2007.
Newton noticed that during these transactions, unlike transactions
he observed involving other clerks, the cash register tape didn't
move upon the completion of the sale. (Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.21, L.6.)
Ebert submitted one estimate that calculated a 95% probability that
Lombard stole between $71,936.81 and $97,626.76. This estimate
was based on the assumptions that: (1) the first day Lombard stole
from the business was in October 2004 (the date of her earliest
documented theft), (2) Lombard averaged 10.13 inappropriate "no
sale" events (i.e. thefts) per shift, and (3) she stole an average of
$16 per inappropriate "no sale" events (based approximately on the
amount of money found on her person at the time of arrest, $282,
less $100 that Lombard told police she had brought from home that
day, divided by 10.13, the average estimated number of
inappropriate "no sale" events per day). (R., pp.112-113; Tr.,
p.288, L.39 - p.291, L.18.)
Ebert submitted a second estimate that calculated a 95%
probability that Lombard stole between $150,647.79 and
$204,446.86. This estimate was based on the assumptions that:
(1) Lombard stole every day during her employment, which started
in September 2002, (2) Lombard averaged 10.13 inappropriate "no
sale" events (i.e. thefts) per shift, and (3) she stole an average of
$26 per inappropriate "no sale" event (based approximately on the
amount of money found on her person at the time of arrest, $282,
divided by 10.13, the average estimated number of inappropriate
"no sale" events per day). (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.288, L.19 p.291, L.18.)

*

Ebert testified that Mary Ann's Groceries generated approximately
$150,000 more in gross revenue the year after Lombard was
arrested and her employment was terminated. (Tr., p.295, L.21 p.296, L.23.)

•

Ebert testified that during Lombard's employment at Mary Ann's
Groceries, "everybody" in the community knew that the Lombards
had purchased boats, four-wheelers, campers and Jeeps, and that
they built a new house. (Tr., p.249, Ls.8-25.)

Lombard has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
ordering her to pay $85,000 based on this evidence. While, as emphasized by
Lombard, Ebert's calculations required some statistical assumptions, these
assumptions were based on evidence in the record. Neither these assumptions,
nor the data they were based on, were contested by Lombard, who also did not
contest Ebert's methodology, present any evidence at the restitution hearing, or
propose an alternative restitution amount. Lombard, rather, simply objected to
any utilization of Ebert's estimates as "speculation."
In ordering restitution consistent with the lesser of Ebert's two estimates,
the district court noted that it "was going to take the more conservative approach,
simply because it seems to be awfully hard for any reasonable person to
question that amount." (Tr., p.305, Ls.3-6.) The district court's restitution order
was supported by substantial, and uncontested, evidence.
Finally, Lombard's implication that by not keeping exhaustive records of
inventory, the victims bear responsibility for the court's inability to exactly identify
appropriate restitution is without merit. Mary Ann's Grocery is a small, familyowned store. (Tr., p.24, L.15 - p.25, L.6.) Don Ebert testified that an inventory
control system is uncommon in a business that size. (Tr., p.294, L.15 - p.295,

L.4.) It was this very lack of a sophisticated inventory system that Lombard took
advantage of in carrying out these thefts. While recognizing the state's burden of
proof, Lombard should not be permitted to continue to take advantage of the
nature of Mary Ann's Grocery as a small, family-owned store, and to thus avoid
paying appropriate restitution.
Lombard has not provided argument or authority, using the proper
standard, as to why a district court cannot rely on estimates such as that utilized
in this case to determine appropriate restitution. The district court was within its
discretion to order restitution amounts well within the estimated ranges supported
by the evidence

11.
Lombard Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused its Discretion
A.

Introduction
Lombard contends that since the district court abused its discretion in

awarding Ebert restitution, it also abused its discretion in sentencing Lombard to
a unified prison term of eight years. However, because the restitution order was
proper, Lombard's claim is without merit. Further, even if the restitution order is
vacated or modified, Lombard has still failed to show that the district court
abused its discretion at sentencing.
B.

Standard Of Review
The sentence imposed by a trial court is reviewed for a clear abuse of

discretion. State v. Baker, 136 ldaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Zaitseva, 135 ldaho 11, 13 P.3d 338 (2000)).

C.

The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion At Sentencinq
Lombard contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

a unified eight-year sentence, for the purpose of allowing Lombard ample time to
comply with any restitution order, when, as she alleges, the entry of the
restitution order was itself an abuse of the district court's discretion. (Appellant's
brief, p.13.) However, as discussed above, the district court's restitution order
was appropriate. Further, even if this Court vacates or modifies the restitution
order. Lombard has not shown that the district court abused its discretion at
sentencing.
ldaho appellate courts presume that the sentencing court is able to
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. State v. Pierce,
100 ldaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 392, 393 (1979); State v. Bundy, 122 ldaho 111, 113,
831 P.2d 953, 955 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Holmes, 104 ldaho 312, 314, 658
P.2d 983, 985 (Ct. App. 1983). "A sentencing judge may properly conduct an
inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to kind of information
considered or the source from which it may come." State v. Wickel, 126 ldaho
578, 580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Chapman, 120
ldaho 466, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991)). A sentence is reasonable if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any
of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.
v. Baker, 136 ldaho 576, 577,38 P.3d 614,615 (2001).

State

The district court sentenced Lombard prior to the restitution hearing and
entry of any restitution order.

(R., pp.105-106.)

However, the evidence

presented at trial and during the sentencing hearing made clear that the amount
stolen by Lombard was substantial. The district court did not find Lombard's
assertion that she stole only a total of $400 credible.'

(Tr., p.269, L.13 - p.270,

L.15.) While the exact amount of the restitution order would not be determined
until the later restitution hearing, it was appropriate for the court to consider the
impact of restitution on this case in fashioning a sentence.
Further, the district court's sentencing analysis confirmed that the
sentence was based on factors other than restitution. The court thoroughly
discussed the proper sentencing factors both at the start of the sentencing
hearing, and during its verbal sentencing analysis. (Tr., p.238, L.16 - p.239,
L.21; p.269, L . l

- p.274, L.9.)

In particular, the court expressed concern about

Lombard's inability to take responsibility for the full extent of her crimes, and the
impact of this inability on Lombard's potential rehabilitation. (Id.)
Finally, the court's sentence, which included the privilege of the rider
program, was objectively reasonable regardless of the final restitution award.
Lombard apparently made the claim that she only stole $400 during her
employment at Mary Ann's Groceries to the pre-sentence investigator (Tr., p.260,
Ls.19-21). However, the PSI has not been included in the appellate record. The
appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record to substantiate his or
her claims of error before the appellate court. State v. Beason, 119 ldaho 103,
105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 ldaho 872, 873,
702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. $985). "In the absence of an adequate record on
appeal, we will not presume error." State v. Lonaoria, 133 ldaho 819, 823, 992
P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999). "Missing portions of the record must be
presumed to support the action of the trial court." Lonsoria, 133 ldaho at 823,
992 P.2d at 1223 (citing Kunler v. Drown, 119 ldaho 687, 690, 809 P.2d 1166,
1169 (Ct. App. 1991)).

Lombard betrayed the trust of her employers and friends repeatedly over a
period of time. (Tr., p.245, Ls.18-24.) She has failed to show that the district
abused its discretion
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
restitution order, and Lombard's sentence.
DATED this 28th day of January 2010

C-C

TJ -

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of January, 2010 1 caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
John Charles Mitchell
Clark and Feeney
P.O. Box Drawer 285
Lewiston, ID 83501

v

'

?

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

